Abstract-In this paper, we propose a game theoretical approach to tackle the problem of the distributed formation of the uplink tree structure among the relay stations (RSs) and their serving base station (BS) in an IEEE 802.16j WiMAX network. Unlike existing literature, which focused on the performance assessment of the network in the presence of the RSs, we investigate the topology and dynamics of the tree structure in the uplink of an 802.16j network. We model the problem as a network formation game, where each RS aims to maximize its utility that accounts for the gains from cooperation in terms of bit error rate (BER) and the delay costs resulting from multi-hop transmission. The proposed utility model is based on the concept of the R-factor which is a parameter suitable for assessing the performance of VoIP services. For forming the tree structure, we propose a distributed myopic best response dynamics in which each RS can autonomously choose the path that connects it to the BS through other relays while optimizing its utility. Using the proposed dynamics, the RSs can self-organize into the tree structure, and adapt this topology to environmental changes such as mobility while converging to a Nash tree network. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm presents significant gains in terms of average achieved MS utility reaching up to 42.57% compared to the star topology where all RSs are directly connected to the BS, and up to 44.78% compared to the case with no RSs.
I. INTRODUCTION Distributed spatial diversity using cooperative relaying has been recently proposed as an effective technique for mitigating the fading effects of the wireless channel. By cooperative relaying, several nodes can cooperate with a given source node in the transmission of its data to a far away destination, consequently, providing spatial diversity gains for the source node. This class of cooperative relaying is known as cooperative communications [1] . It has been shown that by using one or multiple relays [1] , [2] a significant improvement can be witnessed in terms of bit error rate, throughput, or other QoS parameters. Various aspects of cooperative communications have been discussed such as performance [1] , [2] or resource allocation [3] . Due to this proven advantage of cooperative communications, the IEEE 802.16j mobile multi-hop relay (MMR) task group introduced the concept of multi-hop relaying in the IEEE 802.16 Wireless-MAN (WiMAX) family of broadband networks [4] . The standard introduces a new node, the relay station (RS), for improving the capacity and coverage of 802.16 networks.
Deploying RSs in an 802.16j network faces several challenging issues. For instance, the authors in [5] maximize the total downlink rate in an 802.16j network by finding the optimal position of one RS. Moreover, the work in [6] provides an algorithm to find the optimal locations of the BS and the RSs This work was done during the stay of Walid Saad at the Coordinated Science Laboratory at the University Of Illinois at Urbana -Champaign and is supported by the Research Council of Norway through the projects 183311/S10, 176773/S10 and 18778/V11. minimizing the cost for deployment of a full scale 802.16j network. One challenging area in the context of 802.16j networks is the design and formation of the tree structure connecting the BS to the RSs in its coverage area as dictated by the standard [4] . Clearly, existing literature focused on the performance of the 802.16j network and the optimal placement of the RSs, with few work tackling the problem of the tree formation. The 802.16j standard states that the tree can be formed either at the BS (centralized approach) or by the sole decisions of the RSs (distributed approach) [4] , [7] . One existing work is in [8] where we presented a distributed network formation game model for forming the uplink tree in an 802.16j network. However, the model in [8] does not account for the delay incurred by multihop transmission. The tree formation in 802.16j is also studied in [7] through a centralized approach. However, the work in [7] does not provide a clear algorithm for the tree formation and it does not account for the gains by using cooperative transmission nor for the resulting delay in the network.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a distributed algorithm that allows the RSs in an 802.16j network to form the uplink tree structure, adapting it to environmental changes as the network evolves. Another important contribution is to model the gains in terms of cooperative transmission, while accounting for the costs in terms of the delay incurred by the multi-hop transmission. For this purpose, we adopt a utility function based on the concept of R-factor, which is a suitable criterion for evaluating the performance of VoIP services [9] . The R-factor provides a utility that ties the packet success rate (PSR) and the delay over a transmission path. For forming the tree, we model the problem as a network formation game and we propose a myopic dynamics in which each RS plays its best response strategy that maximizes its utility. The proposed dynamics allow the RSs to self-organize into a Nash network tree structure rooted at the BS. Through simulations, we assess the performance of the proposed algorithm and show how the RSs can autonomously adapt the topology to changes in the environment due to RS mobility or the presence of high traffic.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the system model and the game formulation. In Section III, we expose the proposed utility model and present the proposed dynamics. Simulation results are presented and analyzed in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND GAME FORMULATION A. System Model Consider the uplink of an 802.16j network with M RSs (fixed, mobile or nomadic) and one BS. The 802.16j standard imposes a tree structure to form between the RSs and the BS This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2009 proceedings [4] . Once the uplink tree forms, mobile stations (MSs) can hook to the network by selecting a serving RS (or directly connecting to the BS). Each MS is assigned to the closest RS. We assume that the MSs deposit their packets to their serving RSs using direct transmission. In their turn, the serving RSs act as source nodes transmitting the received MS packets to the BS through one or more hops in the formed tree, using cooperative transmission. This assumption of direct transmission between MS and RS allows to provide a tree formation algorithm that can be easily incorporated in a new or existing 802.16j network without relying on external entities such as the MSs.
For cooperative transmission between the RSs and the BS, we use the decoded relaying multi-hop diversity channel of [2] whereby each intermediate node on the path between a transmitting RS and the BS combines, encodes, and re-encodes the received signal from all preceding terminals before relaying (decode-and-forward). Formally, each MS k in the network is considered as a source of traffic following a Poisson distribution with an average arrival rate λ k . With such Poisson streams at the entry points of the network (the MSs), we assume that for every RS incoming packets are stored and transmitted in a first-in first-out (FIFO) fashion and that we have the Kleinrock independence approximation [10, Chap. 3] with each RS being an M/D/1 queueing system. With this approximation, the total traffic that a RS i receives from the MS that it is serving is a Poisson process with an average arrival rate of
where L i is the number of MSs served by RS i. Moreover, RS i also receives packets from RSs that are connected to it with a total average rate R i . For these R i packets, the sole role of RS i is to relay them to the next hop. In addition, any RS i that has no assigned MSs, transmits "HELLO" packets, generated with a Poisson arrival rate of η 0 in order to maintain its link to the BS active during periods of no actual MS traffic.
B. Game Formulation and Strategies
For modeling the interactions among the RSs seeking to form the uplink tree structure, as imposed by the 802.16j standard, network formation games provide a suitable framework [11] , [12] . In such games, several independent decision makers (players) interact in order to form a network graph. Depending on the goals of each player, a final network graph G, resulting from individual players' decisions, forms. We model the uplink tree formation problem in 802.16j as a network formation game with the RSs being the players. The result of the interactions among the RSs is a directed graph G(V, E) with V = {1, . . . , M + 1} denoting the set of all vertices (M RSs and the BS) and E denoting the set of all edges (links) between pairs of RSs. Each link between two RSs i and j, denoted (i, j) ∈ E, corresponds to an uplink traffic flow between RS i and RS j. First and foremost, we define the notion of a path:
Definition 1: A path between two nodes i and j in the graph G is defined as a sequence of nodes
We denote the set Q i as the set of all paths from node i to the BS, and thus |Q i | represents the number of paths from node i to the BS.
As the 802.16j standard imposes a tree structure between the RSs and the BS [4] , we adopt the following convention Convention 1: Each RS i is connected to the BS through at most one path, and thus |Q i | ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i ∈ V . Hence, we denote by q i ∈ Q i the path between any RS i and the BS. Finally, we delineate the possible actions or strategies that each RS can take in the proposed game. The strategy space of each RS i consists of the RSs (or the BS) that i wants to connect to. Consequently, the strategy of a RS i is to select the link that it wants to form from the available strategy space. We note that, a RS i cannot connect to a RS j which is already connected to i, in the sense that if (j, i) ∈ G, then (i, j) / ∈ G. Formally, for a current graph G, let A i = {j ∈ V \ {i}|(j, i) ∈ G} be the set of RSs from which RS i accepted a link (j, i), and S i = {(i, j)|j ∈ V \ ({i} A i )} as the set of links corresponding to the nodes (RSs or the BS) with whom i wants to connect (i cannot connect to RSs that are already connected to it, i.e., RSs in A i .). In consequence, the strategy of a RS i is to select the link s i ∈ S i that it wants to form, i.e., choose the RS that it will connect to. Based on Convention 1, a RS can be connected to at most one other node in our game so selecting to form a link s i implicitly implies that RS i will replace its previously connected link (if any) with the new link s i .
III. NETWORK FORMATION GAME: UTILITY AND DYNAMICS

A. Utility
Having modeled the tree formation problem as a network formation game, we propose a utility function that takes into account the QoS in terms of PSR as well as the delay incurred by multi-hop transmission. Consider an actual network tree graph G where each RS extracts a positive utility from the packets successfully transmitted to the BS out of the packets received from the MSs. Each transmitted packet is subject to a bit error rate (BER) due to the transmission over the wireless channel using one or more hops. For instance, for a transmission between a RS V 1 ∈ V to a destination V n+1 (the destination is always the BS) going through n − 1 intermediate relays {V 2 , . . . , V n } ⊂ V , let N r be the set of all receiving terminals, i.e., N r = {V 2 . . . V n+1 } and N r(i) be the set of terminals that transmit a signal received by a node V i . Hence, for a relay V i on the path from the source V 1 to the destination V n+1 , we have N r(i) = {V 1 , . . . , V i−1 }. Given this notation, the BER between a source RS V 1 ∈ V and the destination V n+1 = BS is computed along the path q V1 = {V 1 , . . . , BS} ∈ Q V1 using the tight upper bound given in [2, Eq. (10)] for the multi-hop diversity channel with Rayleigh fading and BPSK modulation as follows
Here, the average received SNR at node j from node i is
where P i is the transmit power of node i, σ 2 the noise variance and
is the path loss with d i,j the distance between i and j and α the path loss exponent. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the RSs transmit with equal power P i =P , ∀i. Finally, for a RS i which is connected to the BS through a direct transmission path q d i ∈ Q i with no intermediate hops, the BER can be given by P
where γ i,BS is the SNR received at the BS from RS i. Using the BER expression in (1) and with no channel coding, the PSR ρ i,qi perceived by a RS i over a path q i is defined as follows
where B is the number of bits per packet. The PSR is a function of the network graph G as the path q i varies depending on how RS i is connected to the BS in the formed network tree structure. Transmitting over multi-hop links incurs a significant delay due to buffering and multiple transmission. For this purpose, we consider the average delay τ i,qi along the path
.
is the capacity of the direct transmission between RS i k and
is the received SNR from RS i k at RS i k+1 , and W is the bandwidth available for RS i k assumed the same for all RSs in the set of vertices V , without loss of generality. The delay depends on the paths from the RSs to the BS, and hence, is a function of the network graph G.
For VoIP services, given the delay and the PSR, an appropriate utility function can be defined through the concept of the R-factor [9] . The R-factor is an expression that links the delay and packet loss to the voice quality as follows [9] U
where τ i,qi is the delay given by (3) expressed in milliseconds, 100(1−ρ i,qi ) represents the packet loss percentage (we consider only the packet loss due to errors through ρ i,qi in (2), ignoring packet loss due to overloaded links). The remaining parameters are constants defined as: Ω a = 94.2, 1 = 0.024, 2 = 0.11, 3 = 177.3, H = 0 if τ i,qi < 3 , H = 1 otherwise. The parameters υ 1 , υ 2 , and υ 3 depend on the voice speech codec. The relationship between the R-factor and the VoIP service quality is such that as the R-factor increases, the voice quality improves [9] . Although the RSs are the players of the game, the final results must assess the performance of the MSs in terms of the R-factor achieved (considered as MS utility). For computing the R-factor of the MSs, the PSR, and the delay for the whole transmission from MS to BS must be considered. For instance, based on the proposed network model in Section II, the PSR perceived by each MS i served by a RS j is given by The RSs take action sequentially by priority. Each RS i plays its best response s * i , maximizing its utility (R-factor). The best response s * i of each RS is a replace link operation through which a RS i splits from its current parent RS and replaces it with a new RS that maximizes its utility. Multiple rounds are run until convergence to the final Nash tree G † where no RS can improve its utility by a unilateral change of strategy.
where ρ i,ij is the PSR on the direct transmission between MS i and RS j (independent of network graph G) and ρ j,qj (G) is the PSR from RS j to the BS along path q j given by (2) (which can be either a multi-hop transmission or a direct transmission depending on how RS j is connected in the tree graph G). Moreover, the delay perceived by a MS i served by RS j is given by (3) by taking into account, in addition to the delay on the path q j , the traffic on the link (i, j) between the MS and the RS, i.e., the buffering and transmission delay at the MS level.
B. Dynamics of Network Formation
Having formulated a network formation game between the RSs, the next step is to define an algorithm of interaction between the RSs in order to form the desired network graph. Network formation algorithms are referred to in the literature as dynamics of network formation. For our game, prior to providing a dynamics for network formation, we first show that any dynamics will result in a connected tree structure, as follows Property 1: Any network graph G resulting from a dynamics applied to the proposed network formation game is a connected directed tree structure rooted at the BS.
Proof: By inspecting the utility in (5), we notice that if a RS i is not connected to the BS through direct transmission or other multi-hop paths (Q i = ∅), we have ρ i,qi = 0 as all packets are lost (no packet reaches the BS). As a result, the last term in (5) is maximized and the whole utility is minimized (the delay from RS to BS is also infinite if Q i = ∅). Hence, a disconnection by any RS drastically decreases its utility and there is no incentive for any RS to disconnect from the BS. Consequently, any graph G formed using the proposed game is a connected graph and due to Convention 1, this graph is a tree rooted at the BS. Due to the high disconnection cost, if a RS is unable to find any partner suitable for forming a link, it will connect to the BS through direct transmission. Thus, our network initially starts with all the RSs connected to the BS (star topology).
Denote G si,s−i as the graph G formed when RS i plays a strategy s i ∈ S i while all other RSs maintain their vector of strategies s − i = [s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , s i+1 , . . . , s M ] . We define the best response for a RS as follows [12] .
Thus, the best response for RS i is to make the selection of the link that maximizes its utility given that the other RSs maintain their vector of strategies. By using the different properties of the RS network formation game, we propose best response dynamics that allow a distributed formation of the network graph. The proposed dynamics assume that each RS is myopic, in the sense that the RSs aim at improving their payoff considering only the current state of the network without taking into account the future evolution of the network. Finding optimal dynamics is a very complex problem, and there exist no strict rules for network formation dynamics in the literature [11] . Therefore, for each network formation game model, different dynamics rules must be applied suited to the considered model. Network formation literature encompasses several myopic dynamics for game models with directed and undirected graphs [11] , [12] . In this paper, we propose a myopic dynamics inspired from [11] and [12] . The proposed algorithm is composed of several rounds where each round consists mainly of two phases: a fair prioritization phase and a dynamics phase. Each round of the proposed algorithm begins with the fair prioritization phase where each RS is assigned a priority depending on its actual perceived BER: RSs with a higher BER are assigned a higher priority. The motivation behind this procedure is to fairly allow RSs that are perceiving a bad channel to possess an advantage in selecting their partners; for the purpose of improving their BER. Thus, the RSs experiencing a high BER can select their partners out of a larger space of strategies during the dynamics phase. Other priority functions can also be used, and in a general case, a random priority function can be defined. Following prioritization, the RSs start selecting their strategies sequentially by order of priority. During its turn, each RS i chooses to play its best response s * i ∈ S i in order to maximize its utility at each round given the current network graph resulting from the strategies of the other RSs. The best response of each RS can be seen as a replace operation, whereby the RS will replace its current link to the BS with another link that maximizes its utility.
Multiple rounds consisting of the above two phases will be run until convergence to the final tree structure G † where the RSs can no longer improve their utility through best responses. The proposed algorithm is summarized in Table I .
The stability of the final graph G † is given using the concept of Nash equilibrium applied to network formation games [12] : Definition 3: A network graph G in which no node i can improve its utility by a unilateral change in its strategy s i ∈ S i is a Nash network.
Therefore, a Nash network is a network where the links chosen by each node are the best responses. Hence, in such a network, the nodes are in a Nash equilibrium with no node able to improve its utility by unilaterally changing its current strategy. When our dynamics converge, and as an immediate consequence of playing a best response dynamics, we have:
Lemma 1: The final tree structure G † resulting from the proposed dynamics is a Nash network.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS For simulations, we consider a square area of 4 km × 4 km with the BS at the center. We deploy the RSs and the MSs within this area. The transmit power isP = 50 mW (RSs and MSs), In Fig. 1 we randomly deploy M = 10 RSs within the BS area. The network formation game starts with the star topology where all RSs are connected directly to the BS. Prior to the presence of the MSs in the network (only HELLO packets present), the RSs interact and converge to a final Nash tree structure shown by the solid lines in the figure. This figure clearly shows how the RSs connect to their nearby partners, forming the tree structure. Furthermore, we randomly deploy 50 MSs in the area, and show how the RSs autonomously adapt the topology to this incoming traffic. The new resulting network structure upon deployment of MSs is shown in Fig. 1 in dashed lines. The RSs autonomously self-organize and adapt to the deployed traffic. For instance, RS 3 can no longer accommodate the traffic generated by RS 8 as it drastically decreases its utility. As a result, RS 8 takes the decision to disconnect from RS 3 and improve its R-factor by directly connecting to the BS. Similarly, RS 7 disconnects from RS 10 and connects directly to the BS. Moreover, RS 9 finds it beneficial to replace its link with RS 5 with a link with the less loaded RS 10. In a nutshell, Fig. 1 summarizes the operation of the proposed dynamics.
Furthermore, we assess the effect of mobility on the network structure. We consider the network of Fig. 1 prior to the deployment of the MSs and we assume that RS 5 is moving upwards on the positive y-axis while the other RSs remain fixed. The changes in utility of the concerned RSs during the movement of RS 5 are shown in Fig. 2 . As RS 5 moves upwards, its utility starts by dropping since the distance to its serving RS (RS 6) increases. Upon moving 0.2 km, RS 9 finds it beneficial to replace its link with RS 5 with a link to RS 6, adapting the topology. When RS 5 has moved 0.4 km, it decides to disconnect from RS 6 and connect to RS 3 improving its utility. As RS 5 gets closer to RS 3, its utility continues to improve. After moving 1.2 km, RS 5 approaches RS 8 which finds it beneficial to disconnect its link with RS 3 and connect to RS 5. At this point the utility of RS 5 drops due to the newly accepted traffic; moreover, this utility drops further as RS 5 distances itself from its serving RS (RS 3). Meanwhile, the utility of RS 8 continues to improve as RS 5 gets closer to it. Through these results, we clearly illustrate how the RSs can autonomously self-organize adapting the topology to mobility. Similar results can be shown when new RSs enter the network or RSs leave the network with or without the presence of MSs, but these results are omitted due to space limitation.
In Fig. 3 , we show the average achieved utility per MS as the number of RSs, M , in the network increases. The results are averaged over random positions of the MSs and the RSs in a network having 40 MSs. We compare the performance of the proposed algorithm against the star topology whereby each RS is directly connected to the BS as well as the scenario where no RSs exist in the network. In this figure, we clearly see that as the number of RSs in the network increases the performance of the proposed algorithm as well as for the star topology improves. However, for the star topology the slope of increase is much slower than that of the proposed algorithm. In addition, the proposed algorithm presents a clear performance advantage, increasing with the number of the RSs, and reaching up to 42.57% and 44.78% (at M = 20 RSs) relative to the star topology and the no RSs case, respectively.
V. CONCLUSIONS This paper proposed a novel distributed approach to the uplink tree formation problem in 802.16j networks through a network formation game model. In the proposed game, the RSs engage in pairwise interactions for forming directed links that result in a final uplink tree structure rooted at the BS. Each RS aims to maximize its utility which accounts for the gains in terms of PSR while taking into account the delay costs incurred by multi-hop transmission. For VoIP services, a suitable utility is derived through the concept of the R-factor which is a parameter that assesses VoIP quality through an expression that ties the PSR and the delay. We proposed best response dynamics for network formation that converge to a Nash network. Using the proposed dynamics, the RSs can autonomously form the tree topology and adapt it to environmental changes such as mobility or incoming traffic. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm presents significant gains in terms of average achieved MS utility reaching up to 42.57% improvement compared to the star topology (all RSs directly connected to the BS), and up to 44.78% compared to the case with no RSs.
